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ABSTRACT 
An investigative journalist describes how grassroots 
environmental struggles in three different communities—
in Oklahoma, Florida, and Louisiana—contain 
similarities that reveal larger patterns about the long path 
communities must follow to achieve environmental justice.  
Residents living near industry fence lines cannot depend 
on regulators or industry to protect them, the author 
concludes, but must gather their own evidence of 
pollution’s effects.  Environmental justice—in the form of 
reduced pollution or relocation from dangerous plants—is 
possible.  But, as the case studies show, such resolution is 













TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN 
HANDS: FENCE LINE FIGHTING AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FROM A 
JOURNALIST’S POINT OF VIEW 
Ronnie Greene∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
In Ponca City, Oklahoma, black mist from a carbon 
plant rained on people, pets and lawns for so long, 
                                                          
∗  Ronnie Greene, an investigative reporter with The Center for 
Public Integrity in Washington, is author of NIGHT FIRE: BIG OIL, 
POISON AIR, AND MARGIE RICHARD’S FIGHT TO SAVE HER TOWN, and 
numerous shorter works investigating environmental injustice in 
communities across the United States.  A nationally honored author 
and journalist formerly with THE MIAMI HERALD, Greene is pursuing 
a Masters in Nonfiction Writing from The Johns Hopkins University.  
The author would like to thank Traci Lynne Timmons of Barry 
University School of Law for her assistance on this article. 
 
1  This article is based predominantly on the author’s 
experiences as a journalist in the field.  As an investigative journalist 
for over twenty years, the author is able to provide a longitudinal 
study of the challenges confronting environmental justice 
communities.  Although the earlier articles were published 
individually when written, this piece collects and analyzes 
overarching observations of commonalities reflected in the challenges 
facing environmental justice communities.  It allows the author an 
opportunity to synthesize recurrent themes and focus the reader on 
systemic challenges. The earlier works inform the author and serve 
as the foundation for the factual observations and subsequent 
reflections on the whole.  Ronnie Greene, Community Coated in 
Black—Until Citizens Fought Back, The Center for Public Integrity 
(Nov. 7, 2011), 
http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/11/07/7297/community-coated-black-
mist-until-citizens-fought-back [hereinafter Greene, Community 
Coated in Black]; Ronnie Greene, Small-town Residents Living on 
Deadly Ground, THE MIAMI HERALD (May 3, 2008) [hereinafter 
Greene, Small-town Residents]; Ronnie Greene, Tiny Toxic Florida 
Town Takes on a Corporate Goliath, THE  MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 15, 
2010) [hereinafter Greene, Toxic Florida Town]; Ronnie Greene, 
Residents, Lockheed Martin on Brink of Settling Contamination Case, 
THE  MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Greene, Residents, 
Lockheed];  RONNIE GREENE,  NIGHT FIRE: BIG OIL, POISON AIR, AND 
MARGIE RICHARD'S FIGHT TO SAVE HER TOWN (2008) [hereinafter 





residents filed twenty binders of complaints with 
regulators.2  A Native American mother had her child ride 
her bike, with training wheels, inside to avoid the mist.3  
A teenager kept his prized white Dallas Cowboys jersey 
wrapped in plastic.4  State inspectors documented the 
pollution for more than a decade, but levied few financial 
sanctions against industry.5 
In Tallevast, Florida, an underground plume of 
toxins seeped into the community’s groundwater for 
decades before detection, billowing into a 200-acre brew of 
cancer-causing TCE and other hazards.6  The historic 
black community, built by turn-of-the-century turpentine 
workers, only discovered the plume by chance; 
government and industry didn’t tell the residents.7  Now, 
Tallevast threatens to wither from pollution years after 
residents began charting cancer cases with stick pins on a 
board.8 
In Norco, Louisiana, explosions from a Shell 
chemical plant and neighboring refinery killed citizens in 
the streets and workers in the plant.9  For decades, 
                                                          
2  The plant the author is referring to is Continental Carbon, a 
carbon plant located in Ponca City, Oklahoma. See Continental 
Carbon, Ponca City, Oklahoma, Plant, 
http://www.continentalcarbon.com/company/ponca-city-directions.asp 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
 
3  The “mist” the author is referencing is “carbon black,” a 
product used in tires, rubber and plastic goods.  Carbon black is a 
“carbon in the form of colloidal particles that are produced by 
incomplete combustion or thermal decomposition of gaseous or liquid 
hydrocarbons under controlled conditions.” See Carbonblack.org, 
What is Carbon Black?, http://www.carbon-black.org/what_is.html 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
 
4  Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1.  
 
5  Id.  
 
6  Tallevast Information Center, Tallevast, Florida & Lockheed 
Martin, http://www.tallevast.info/tallevast (last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
 
7  Greene, Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1.  
 
8  BUREAU OF ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH MED., FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 






homeowners in the four-street, all African American 
Diamond neighborhood, suffered sickness and worry as 
some of their homes stood twenty-five feet from the 
chemical plant fence line.10  For more than a decade, Shell 
Oil refused their requests for relocation.11 
These three fence line fights, centered in little 
known hamlets hundreds of miles apart, serve as striking 
case studies of how working class communities of color—
imperiled by pollution and seemingly neglected by 
regulators—must take the law in to their own hands.   In 
each case, the residents turned to the courts for justice. 
They filed lawsuits against big industry as their last hope 
for relief—seeking relocation from these dangerous fence 
lines.12  The legal results in these cases ultimately 
brought some measures of relief, but the respective 
journeys in Ponca City, Tallevast, and Norco were 
hindered by delays and difficulties. 
In Louisiana, Diamond residents lost their court 
case against Shell Oil in 1997.13  Yet the legal case helped 
re-energize their quest for relief and attracted aggressive 
grassroots activists to their cause.  Five years later, in 
2002, the Diamond community cemented a historic 
relocation pact with the Fortune 500 Company.14  This 
settlement was among the most noteworthy 
environmental justice verdicts for generations.  
The Ponca Tribe of Indians in Oklahoma secured a 
$10.5 million settlement with the Continental Carbon 
Company, the world’s fourth largest carbon black 
manufacturer, in 2009 the case was filed in U.S. District 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9  See generally Death Toll up to 6 in Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 
1988, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/07/us/death-toll-
up-to-6-in-blast.html. 
 
10  GREENE, NIGHT FIRE, supra note 1, at 7.  
 
11  Id.  
 
12  Ponca Tribe of Indians v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 439 F. Supp. 
1171 (W.D. Okla. 2006); Ward v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2008 WL 
8188990 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 23, 2008) (Trial Order); Richards v. Shell 
Oil Co., 1993 WL 541525 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 1993).  
 
13  Richards, WL 541525.  
 




Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.15  This 
instance was one of four community lawsuits settled with 
industry within the past six years.  Tallevast residents 
secured an out of court settlement in 2010 with Fortune 
500 Company Lockheed Martin on their main property 
contamination lawsuit.16  The settlement of this lawsuit 
was one of four legal cases the community filed after 
learning of the pollution plume. 
As a journalist and author, I spent years 
researching the stories in Louisiana, Florida and 
Oklahoma, talking with people on the ground, pulling 
environmental inspection reports and reviewing the legal 
papers filed in each case.  As an investigative journalist 
for The Center for Public Integrity, a nonprofit 
investigative news center in Washington, I described 
Ponca City’s travails with carbon black in 2011.17  As an 
investigative journalist with The Miami Herald for a 
decade before that, I explored Tallevast’s plight with 
Lockheed Martin and TCE.18  As an author, I detailed 
Diamond’s struggle with Shell in my narrative nonfiction 
book, Night Fire: Big Oil, Poison Air, and Margie 
Richard’s Fight to Save Her Town.19  
The three seemingly unrelated cases, my research 
shows, actually hold much in common.  For instance, in 
each case, citizens pressed for reform in the courts 
because they believed government wasn’t fully protecting 
them and industry was not responsive to their concerns.  
                                                          
15  Continental Carbon, 439 F. Supp. at 1171; see also Ponca 
Tribe of Indians v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 2009 WL 2836508 (W.D. Okla. 
Jul. 30, 2009) (hereinafter Ponca Settlement).   
 
16  Timothy Wolfrum, Tallevast Residents, Lockheed Martin 




17  Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1. 
 
18   See Greene, Small-town Residents, supra note 1; see also 
Greene, Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1, and Greene, Residents, 
Lockheed, supra note 1. TCE is the chemical compound, 
trichloroethylene. 
 




In short, the people had to find justice themselves, not 
depend on industry or government. 
Furthermore, each legal case led to steps forward—
either directly or indirectly.  In Ponca City, the four cases 
produced settlements and helped fence line residents 
nearest the carbon plant move to new homes.  In 
Tallevast, the prime lawsuit landed a settlement 
agreeable to most in the plaintiff class.  In Norco, the 
legal case was lost, but the trial’s publicity attracted 
advocates that helped the neighborhood ultimately move 
away from the fence line. 
Moreover, successes came only after hurdles, 
frustrations and setbacks.  Each community had to 
overcome significant obstacles and wait years to secure 
progress.  Ponca City homeowners complained to state 
regulators for more than a decade about pollution before 
finally turning to the courts.  Norco residents pushed 
Shell for more than a decade to fund relocation and lost 
their court case before resolution came.  In Tallevast, 
despite the lawsuit settlement, residents still await an 
industry-funded relocation as they suffer through a 
decades-long cleanup and dwindling property values. 
 Most significantly, big industry had placed its 
plants, and thus its pollutants, in blue collar communities 
of low income, of color, or both.  Ultimately, these cities 
showcase that fence line communities can fight back.  
But, as these case studies show, cities in similar 
situations should not expect success to arrive quickly, or 
easily. 
This article will summarize each community’s story 
from my point of view as an investigative journalist.  The 
lessons revealed in Oklahoma, Florida, and Louisiana 
carry resonance for any community battling big industry, 
environmental hazards, and seemingly indifferent 
regulators.  
II. PONCA CITY, OKLAHOMA. 
In this city of 25,000 two hours upstate of 
Oklahoma City, the air pollution was so prevalent 
residents could touch it: on their hands, their shoes, their 
pets, their clothes, their children’s toys.  For more than a 
decade, residents filled the local Department of 
Environmental Quality office with complaints so vast they 
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took twenty binders to hold.20  The complaints, some 
coming from members of the Ponca Tribe of Indians living 
nearest the plant, cited Continental Carbon Co., 
manufacturer of carbon black, a product used in tires, 
rubber and plastic goods.21  The plant manufactures 
carbon black from petroleum refinery residual oil, and the 
finished substance is a form of almost pure carbon 
classified as a possible carcinogen.22 
Homeowners complained their dogs’ feet turned 
black walking through town, and that their white tennis 
shoes changed color.23  Yet, records reveal that the state’s 
own policies hampered efforts to curb the pollution; for 
many years, the Oklahoma Department of Environmental 
Quality would file a citation and seek fines against 
Continental Carbon only if its inspectors actually 
witnessed the “fugitive dust” leaving the plant.24  
Evidence of black dust found on residents’ property was 
not enough.  “They said as they interviewed people and 
took complaints, unless it happened while they were 
here—and it didn’t—it didn’t happen.  They didn’t have 
the resources to take samples and to go back and test it,” 
Richard Stone, the city’s former mayor, stated.25 
For a time in 2003, overrun with complaints, the 
state regulatory agency told residents it could no longer 
send inspectors to visit homes.26  Even after inspectors 
                                                          
20  Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1. 
 
21  Carbonblack.org, supra note 3.   
 
22  See CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
OCCUPATIONAL AND SAFETY GUIDELINE FOR CARBON BLACK POTENTIAL 
HUMAN CARCINOGEN (1988), http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/81-
123/pdfs/0102.pdf  
 
23  Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1. 
 
24  The author researched the Oklahoma Department of 
Environmental Quality records and conducted interviews.  See 
Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1. 
 
25   Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1. The 
author was informed of this as he researched Ponca City’s plight for 
The Center for Public Integrity’s national series on air pollution, 
Poisoned Places. 
 




turned out again, complaints continued to pour in.  “They 
just really ignored us, and got mad when we told them 
they were ignoring us,” Jesse Beck, environmental 
manager for the Ponca Tribe of Indians, said of state 
regulators.27 
State inspectors often spotted black particulate 
matter on residents’ property.  But the cases nearly 
always ended there, without a citation against industry, 
the Center’s review of 726 citizen complaints logged from 
1993 to 2011 revealed.28  State regulators said they were 
diligent, taking action as their rules allowed.  Houston-
based Continental Carbon, Ponca City’s third largest 
employer, blamed other sources for the pollution and said 
it spent millions to reduce emissions.29  “Any issues that 
are identified in the plant operation are immediately 
addressed,” Dennis Hetu, Continental Carbon’s recently 
appointed president, told me.30  He said the company puts 
environmental compliance behind only safety. 
But the people, fed up, had enough.  “Living with 
that plant was a complete nightmare,” resident Karen 
Howe stated.31  Howe recalled moving into a 3-bedroom 
house just across the fence from the plant.  At the time, 
she was a single mother.  “The dust came into your home. 
I couldn’t open my windows on the east side of the house 
because it came in,” she said for my story for The Center 
for Public Integrity.   
I tried to get the kids a couple of pets, of 
course they were outside dogs.  As soon as 
they were outside even three or four days 
you couldn’t even pet them because your 
hands would be all black.  If they rubbed up 
against you it would be black on your skin 
and on your clothes. 
                                                          
27  Id. 
 
28  The Center for Public Integrity, http://www.iwatchnews.org/ 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012).  
 
29  Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1. 
 
30  Id.  
 




Files of the state environmental agency document 
multiple plant breakdowns over the years that allowed 
carbon dust to reach the air.32  For residents, it was a 
frequent struggle with carbon black.  “It was a constant 
cleanup.  It was bleach and water.  It was always, bleach 
and water,” said Jonathan Thomas, a father of three who 
works for the Ponca Tribe of Indians.  “You couldn’t have 
white clothes.  You just couldn’t have nothing nice.”  
Scotty Simpson Jr., a member of the Ponca Tribe business 
committee, said he’d wash his 1997 white Ford truck, only 
to find it black the next day.  A Dallas Cowboys fan, 
Simpson proudly owned jersey #22—Hall of Fame 
running back Emmitt Smith.  He kept the jersey in a 
plastic bag inside his house to protect it.  When he went 
out, he was careful not to touch anything.  “Once you got 
carbon black on it, it was done,” Simpson said.33 
It took a string of lawsuit settlements before the 
complaints finally began to ebb.  The first two cases were 
filed in 2005, one by town residents, businesses and City 
Hall, and another by the Ponca Tribe of Indians.34  In 
2006, the plant settled with City Hall for $400,000 and 
residents for about $8 million.  In 2009, Continental 
Carbon Co. paid a $10.5 million settlement to the Tribe.  
Residents filed a third case in 2007 against Continental 
Carbon and refinery ConocoPhillips, a case settled in 
2010.  A fourth case, brought by homeowners in 2009, 
reached an $800,000 settlement.  Each time, Continental 
Carbon denied that it caused the pollution but said it 
settled the cases to move its business forward. 
In all, the cases settled for some $20 million.35  The 
extent of state fines in the same period: $25,437.36  As the 
cases moved through the courts, emissions went down and 
                                                          
32  The author reviewed thousands of pages of Citizen 
Complaints about carbon black on file at the Oklahoma Department 
of Environmental Quality offices in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
during field research in 2011.  The files, catalogued by year as 
Complaints, were contained in 20 binders.  
 
33  Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1. 
  
34  See Continental Carbon, 439 F. Supp. at 1171. 
 
35  Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1. 
 




citizen complaints did, too.  In 2006, the state Department 
of Environmental Quality changed its policy on fugitive 
dust ”from having to see it cross the property line,” an 
agency spokeswoman said, “to if there is clear evidence of 
fugitive dust crossing the property line, such as dust on 
cars.”37  That change came a year after the first two 
lawsuits were filed. 
In 2009, the year of the $10.5 million settlement, 
plant emissions reported to EPA dropped drastically.38  In 
the $10.5 million settlement, the Ponca Nation received a 
$320,595 check, and individual homeowners received 
thousands.39  Lawyers, who logged almost $1.8 million in 
expenses and 15,000 hours, received 40 percent.40  The 
largest individual payouts went to 11 homeowners living 
closest to the plant; the carbon company spent $300,000 
each to move them to new homes.41 
                                                          
37  Id.; OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 252:100-29-2(c)1 (2012):   
 
(c) Emission boundaries. 
(1) No person shall cause or allow the 
discharge of any visible fugitive dust 
emissions beyond the property line 
of the property on which the emissions 
originate in such a manner as to 
damage or to interfere with the use of 
adjacent properties. If the DEQ 
determines that this rule has been 
violated, the owner or operator of the 
fugitive dust emissions source or 
sources shall implement controls, 
subject to economic and technological 
feasibility, to prevent future 
violations.  
 
Id. (emphasis added).  
 
38  Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1. 
 
39  Ponca Settlement, WL 2836508 *4. 
 
40  Id. at *3. 
 
41  See Brian Daffron, Ponca Nation Gets $10.5 million 







Today, the ground is covered with grass.  “I almost 
blame the government for allowing those homes to even 
be there. They should never have been built there,” 
plaintiff Amos Hinton stated.42  A descendant of Ponca 
Chief Standing Buffalo, Hinton said he even spotted black 
residue at the gravesite.  “My interest was to stop the 
polluting on my family’s land—the desecration of this 
man’s burial site,” he said.43 
While residents still occasionally cite carbon black, 
the level of complaints has dipped tremendously.44  In 
Ponca City, change, residents and community leaders say, 
is in the air. 
III. TALLEVAST, FLORIDA. 
A long-closed plant anchors one end of this small 
blue collar town, and the main drag, Tallevast Road, is 
without sidewalks.45  Yet, a small town atmosphere 
pervades this hamlet near Bradenton, Florida.  News 
spreads from house to house, neighbors are often related, 
and most of the eighty homes exude the stability of its 
working-class inhabitants. 
Environmental contamination threatens to destroy 
the heritage of this historic black town.  In an 
environmental drama that has played out for more than a 
decade, the residents are pitted against giant defense 
contractor Lockheed Martin, Manatee County, and the 
state of Florida.  The problem begins at the former 
American Beryllium Company plant at 1600 Tallevast 
Road, across the street from a community church.46  
                                                          
42  Greene, Community Coated in Black, supra note 1. 
 
43  Id.  
 
44  Id.  
 
45  The author writes as to his personal recollections as he visited 
Tallevast, Florida as an investigative reporter for THE MIAMI HERALD. 
See Greene, Small-town Residents, supra note 1; see also Greene, 
Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1; see also Greene, Residents, 
Lockheed, supra note 1.  
 
46  American Beryllium Corporation was purchased by Lockheed 
Martin in 1996. See Florida Department of Health, DOH Timeline of 




Opened in 1961 and closed in 1996, the plant 
manufactured machine parts for nuclear weapons using 
beryllium-containing metals.  Workers inhaled hazardous 
dust and handled a toxic degreaser that cleaned machine 
parts. 
In January 2000, as it prepared to sell the plant it 
had recently purchased, Lockheed Martin discovered a 
leak of solvents from those degreasers.47  The leaching, 
state officials say, could have begun thirty-eight years 
earlier.48  The company told the county and state, which 
discovered an underground plume seeping 200 acres in a 
town of 1.5 square miles, where some residents still drank 
and showered from well water.49  The main hazard was 
TCE, a cancer-causing chemical used in the degreaser 
that had drawn attention in the book A Civil Action.50 
Tallevast residents were not informed of the 
contamination, but discovered it by chance more than 
three years later, in September 2003.  “Why didn't anyone 
tell us?” Cassandra 'Casey' Brice, whose grandfather co-
founded the town’s Bryant Chapel Christian Methodist 
Episcopal Church, asked as I sat at her kitchen table one 
morning in 2010.  Brice became the town’s unofficial 
historian, clipping every article about the contamination. 
Both of Brice's parents died after bouts with cancer.  
She worried her mother's death was linked to the 
pollution.  “All these years we were drinking the water 
and not knowing it was contaminated,” Brice told me as I 
investigated the community’s struggle for The Miami 
Herald.  The pollution’s discovery killed property values 
and sparked worries that any deaths, cancers, and cases 
of the deadly lung disease Berylliosis51 were linked to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.doh.state.fl.us/environment/community/SUPERFUND/ha
zwastework/currenttimeline.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2012). 
 
47  Id.  
 
48  Greene, Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1. 
 
49  Id.  
 
50  JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995). 
 
51  Berylliosis is lung inflammation caused by the inhalation of 




plant.  Affixing stick pins on a board, residents count 
more than eighty cancer cases over three decades.52 
Now, deeply rooted homeowners are desperate for 
Lockheed Martin to pay to move them out.  The company 
refuses, saying the contamination has been capped and 
citing a 2005 opinion from a Florida Department of 
Health doctor that there is no “imminent” health threat.53  
“Had we been shown that there was a pathway between 
those groundwater contaminants and the community, 
that decision may have been different,” said Lockheed 
spokesman Gary Cambre, who said the company is 
committed to rebuilding Tallevast.  “It's not like Lockheed 
can't afford to relocate us,” said lifelong resident Beverly 
Bradley, the sister of Casey Brice.  “The money they spent 
over the years to fight us, they could have relocated us 
and we would be over this.” 
Like others, Bradley is torn.  She loves her 
hometown—but believes she must flee for a community 
uncluttered by pollution, dwindling property values and 
health fears.  Her sister shares the view.  “They expect us 
to live here all the rest of our lives on this toxic plume,” 
said Brice.  “It was such a vibrant, close-knit community 
before this happened.” 
Residents filed four lawsuits, engaging their 
campaign from their grassroots headquarters: a squat 
one-story white building across the street from the former 
plant.  The community is getting help from the School of 
Law at Barry University in Orlando, which has closely 
examined Lockheed Martin's decades-long cleanup plan 
filed with the state.  Jeanne Marie Zokovitch Paben, 
Director of Barry University's Earth Advocacy Clinic, told 
me the case represents one of the most complex 
contamination cleanups in recent Florida history. 
A. Town History 
Tallevast was once blanketed with longleaf slash 
pine trees that lured laborers from Georgia and the 
                                                          
52  Greene, Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1. 
 
53  Greene, Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1; see also MANATEE 






Carolinas.  The thousands who trekked to this hamlet at 
the turn of the 19th century built small homes and 
turpentined for village founder J.H. Tallevast.  The men 
slashed the 100 foot pines to extract the resin, then boiled 
the sticky, brownish-yellow fluid and loaded the 
turpentine into barrels.  The railroad line was extended 
here so tons of turpentine could be shipped north. 
In 1948, with turpentining becoming a memory, the 
Visioneering Company opened an engineering plant on 
Tallevast Road.  In 1960, the company became American 
Beryllium, a subsidiary of Loral Corporation.54  American 
Beryllium (ABC) shifted its headquarters just up the 
road.  At 1600 Tallevast Road, the ABC plant opened in 
the early 1960s to manufacture nuclear reactors and 
weapons.  Former janitor Morris Robinson said he cleaned 
out tanks holding a colorless solution.  “I had to hold my 
breath,” Robinson, a third-generation homeowner, told 
me.  “And I would have to step out of the room, get fresh 
air, hold it, and go back in and finish up.”55 
  In 1996, after the plant closed, Lockheed Martin 
bought the property as part of a $9.1 billion purchase of 
many of the assets of owner Loral Corp.  At purchase, it 
did not conduct an environmental review.  A year later, as 
Lockheed began the process of selling the site, it did. 
By January 2000, the company discovered a leak of 
trichloroethylene, TCE, a cancer risk in drinking water 
that can remain in groundwater for long periods.56  Other 
hazards found include 1,4-dioxane, an industrial chemical 
that can affect the central nervous system and forms 
contamination plumes in groundwater, and the chemical 
tetrachloroethylene, a cancer-causing agent. 
As the owner of the property when the leak was 
discovered, Lockheed Martin was liable for its cleanup.  It 
shared its findings with Florida and Manatee County 
                                                          
54  FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 
TALLEVAST COMMUNITY, TALLEVAST, MANATEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, 





55  Greene, Small-town Residents, supra note 1. 
  




officials and, in September 2001, 538 tons of tainted soil 
was excavated.  Evidence I examined showed that 
contamination leaked into the community.57  A 2001 state 
review said organic compounds “may be migrating off-
site.”  In 2002, Florida officials “raised concerns about 
potential impacts to off-site private wells.”  Residents 
were told nothing.  Why didn't the state inform the 
community?  “I don't believe we had a regulation,” a 
spokeswoman with the Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection told me in 2008, when I first 
wrote of Tallevast.58 
One afternoon in September 2003, resident Laura 
Ward peered out her window to find a rig drilling on her 
land.  “You don't know, but the water is contaminated 
here,” a worker told her.59  “We're putting in monitoring 
wells in your community because the water is 
contaminated.”  Finally, the community was getting wind 
of what was in its groundwater.  A few weeks later, Ward 
and a neighbor huddled with a Lockheed Martin executive 
at the Mount Tabor Missionary Baptist Church.  “There's 
some TCE in the water,” he said.  “We don't think it's very 
far off site.” 
            In truth, the documented size of the plume kept 
growing.  In one spot, the TCE concentration was 10,000 
times above state standards.60  Elsewhere, the state found 
TCE where the company hadn’t.  The discovery came just 
as Ward and others founded a nonprofit—Family 
Oriented Community United Strong (FOCUS)—in hopes 
of luring quality low-cost housing and new businesses to 
Tallevast.  Their revival dreams were buried with the 
                                                          
57  See Greene, Small-town Residents, supra note 1; see also 
Greene, Toxic Florida Town, supra note 1, and Greene, Residents, 
Lockheed, supra note 1.  
  
58  Greene, Small-town Residents, supra note 1.   
 
59  Id.  
  
60  The Florida Department of Environmental Protection has set 
the Florida drinking water standard for trichoroethene (TCE) is 3 
micrograms per liter of water.  See FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 







plume, but the residents prompted a state law that 
requires polluters to notify communities within thirty 
days.  It is called the Tallevast Bill.61 
In September 2010, a decade after the leak’s 
discovery, the community and company agreed to settle a 
property contamination lawsuit brought by 270 residents 
against companies that owned or operated the plant.62  
For residents, a fuller victory remains elusive: relocation 
to new homes.  Today, the village remains an 
environmental testing ground, with 275 wells monitoring 
the plume, sprinklers turned off so as not to spread 
pollution and worry about the future.  “Everything I've 
done, everything I've worked for, is all for nothing,” said 
Robinson, a father of three and Bradenton city worker.63 
IV. NORCO, LOUISIANA. 
In August 1973, a leak from a Shell Chemical plant 
in Norco, Louisiana caught fire with a lawnmower being 
pushed by a 16-year-old, Leroy Jones.  The explosion set 
him afire, taking his life, and catapulted a 72-year-old 
woman, Helen Washington, from her home into the street. 
She, too, was killed.64 
In May 1988, at 3:30 in the morning, a cataclysmic 
explosion from a Shell refinery, on the other side of the 
four-street Diamond neighborhood, killed seven workers 
inside the plant, turned night into day, and triggered 
tremors thirty-five miles away.65  The explosions seared 
fear in the Diamond, a small community sandwiched 
between the chemical plant and refinery.  Some homes 
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stood just twenty-five feet from the chemical plant’s fence 
line. 
A year after the second explosion, Diamond 
residents gathered inside the quaint Masonic meeting 
hall and spoke of the smoke, deaths, and worries.66  That 
evening in 1989, the community officially formed the 
Norco Relocation Committee.  Margie Richard, a single 
mother and public school teacher living in a trailer home 
abutting the chemical plant, was named president. 
The dues were $2 for the elderly, $5 for others.  
Their target: a company so rich with crude it turned $1.5 
million in worldwide profit each hour.67  The residents 
prayed before each meeting and put aside the small group 
dues to pay for homemade picket signs of protest.68  
Margie had her neighbors record their list of goals.  
Number one: relocation from Diamond.  Also on the list: a 
right to a long life, cleaner air and less noise, deduction of 
the flare from the chemical plant’s smokestacks, and, 
getting Shell to talk to them like neighbors.  
The last goal wasn’t easy.  “They would sit there 
and listen, and they would say, ‘We’ll consider it,’” Wilma 
Subra, a Louisiana chemist who studied Norco, told me as 
I researched my book, Night Fire.69  “But there was never 
a response back, ‘Well, we agree to do this.’” 
On October 5, 1993, tired of inaction, the 
community went to court.  Richards vs. Shell Oil 
Company was filed in the courthouse at the Parish of St. 
Charles, on Highway 18 in Hahnville.70  Someone initially 
labeled the case “Richards vs. Shell,” but Margie Richard 
was lead plaintiff representing the interests of like-
minded residents.71 
The legal claim identified the nature of the injuries 
as “negligence, reckless and wanton misconduct, strict 
liability, nuisance, trespass, battery, intentional infliction 
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of emotional distress, [and] negligence in the conduct of 
ultra-hazardous activity.”72  The Diamond lawyers sought 
a verdict awarding enough money for residents to reap 
their ultimate goal of moving out. 
The 25-page complaint stated that the “air 
breathed by the plaintiff . . . is contaminated,” and alleged 
“[p]hysical, economic and psychological” harm to the 
community.73  It said the plant’s emissions dropped the 
market value in Diamond while tainting the air, food, and 
water.74  “Indeed, there is no safe threshold level of 
exposure to many of the chemicals emitted from the Shell 
facility.”75 
The lawyers wanted the courts to shut the chemical 
plant down, “enjoining Shell from further use of said 
facility . . . and decreeing that in default of Shell removing 
said facility, that the Sheriff of St. Charles Parish be 
directed to remove the same at the expense of the 
defendant, Shell.”76  Shell’s corporate and legal strategy 
was simple.  “If they felt they were not wrong on these 
issues, they would fight the lawsuit,” one Shell official 
told me.77  Shell did that, challenging the case on every 
count and contending the plant caused little, if any, harm. 
On March 28, 1994, Margie Richard was deposed 
by Shell’s lawyers.78  Her description of the plant’s harm 
to the community could not be more plain-spoken.  “Do 
you have any particular evidence that would support any 
claim that you and the two hundred and eighty or so odd 
members are being treated any differently than, say, 
people that live on the north side of Norco?” the Shell 
lawyer asked her, according to the court deposition.  She 
replied,  
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The only evidence that we have that may not be 
concrete is what we walk through and live 
through daily . . . .”  “It’s like we’re forgotten.  
It’s like, let us die.  I mean, look, that noise and 
that flaring is bad.  It shakes your house.  The 
evidence is our dishes rattling in the cabinet, 
doors shake.”  “The evidence, it’s like people on 
our street die.79 
In April 1997, as the case continued to wind its way 
through the courts, researchers from the Deep South 
Center for Environmental Justice, based at nearby Xavier 
University in New Orleans, published a survey of the 
community’s health.80  Over thirty-five percent of 
husbands and wives reported having chest pains or 
respiratory congestion, and their children reported 
troubling rates of asthma (thirty-five percent) and 
bronchitis (twenty-eight percent).81  More than one-fourth 
of respondents reported suffering itching, burning eyes.82  
Also common were blurred vision, ear itches, ringing in 
the ears, sinus infections, and persistent coughs. 
The Diamond lawyers never put the Xavier study 
into evidence, however.  Instead, they relied on other 
evidence including state pollution reports and residents’ 
testimony.  Each side hired experts.  In August 1997, 
twenty-four years to the month after Helen Washington 
and Leroy Jones died in the streets, the jurors spoke.  The 
one-sentence question atop their jury verdict form had 
asked: “[d]o you find that the operation of the Defendant’s 
facility is a nuisance within the legal meaning of those 
terms as explained in the instructions?” 
A large X was marked in the box for “No” to the 
question, and the jurors voted 10-2 in favor of Shell.  With 
that, jurors didn’t have to consider what amount of 
damages should be awarded.  There were no damages.  
The international conglomerate had won.  Residents lost 
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the case, yet the lawsuit brought attention to the 
Diamond community—attracting environmental activists 
to town.  And then more scares unfolded. 
On December 8, 1998, at just after eight in the 
morning, a highly flammable chemical began to overheat 
inside a 5,000 gallon Shell tank in the plant’s batch resins 
unit.83  Shell employees sweated furiously, laboring to 
lower the tank’s temperature before it exploded.84  The 
incident commander ordered the Norco Elementary 
School, a half mile away, sealed shut.85  Teachers 
dispersed water and towels, instructing the quarantined 
children to cover their noses. 
Three-and-one-half hours later, the alert was called 
off.  The chemical bomb in the making had been 
contained, and frantic parents rushed into Norco 
Elementary to pull their children out.  The near explosion 
empowered more action.  Residents started capturing 
plant air emissions in an EPA-approved five-gallon 
bucket, and then sent the results for testing.  The “Bucket 
Brigade” documented evidence of pollution and harm that 
regulators had long overlooked. 
Finally, Shell buckled.  In a historic reversal on 
June 11, 2002, Shell offered to buy the entire Diamond 
community: Washington, Cathy, Diamond, and East 
streets.  The company now offered $80,000 minimum for 
an owner-occupied house and $50,000 for a mobile home—
nearly four times what it had been paying in a long-
entrenched policy of paying market value.  Shell assigned 
new faces to negotiate with Diamond, and the results 
showed. 
Margie Richard, the community leader, was 
thankful the relocation pact was approved during her 
lifetime.  Margie’s older sister, Naomi, had died years 
earlier from a rare lung disease often linked to 
environmental hazards.86  “I want to cry tears,” Margie 
said after the homes were bought out.  “Tears of joy.”87 
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Diamond residents succeeded, but it took nearly 30 
years—from the first explosion that August day of 1973—
to achieve their justice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In each community, my reporting found, common 
sense justice was squarely on the residents' side.  In 
Ponca City, Oklahoma, residents woke up many mornings 
to find black smudge on their homes and their clothes, 
and hundreds of times, they turned to state regulators to 
help them.  The complaints piled up, and the pollution 
continued, unstopped, until Native Americans and other 
residents turned to the courts.  
In Tallevast, Florida, residents were not 
responsible for the underground leak of chemicals—a 
former plant was—yet they were kept in the dark about 
the pollution, once it was discovered, by government and 
industry.  To longtime homeowners, neither the county 
nor the state of Florida came to their rescue, and today, 
more than a decade after the leak's discovery, residents 
still find themselves pushing Lockheed Martin to fund a 
relocation from the underground plume.   
  In Norco, Louisiana, the Diamond residents had 
full grounds for concern; some of the resident’s homes 
stood just twenty-five feet from the fence line of the Shell 
Chemical plant.  In Louisiana today, homes must be at 
least 2,000 feet from such potentially harmful facilities, 
but Diamond's residences took root before that law was on 
the books.  Residents witnessed neighbors die in the 
street, workers die at the refinery, and counted troubling 
rates of sickness in their homes.  Yet, they felt regulators 
were not protecting them, and it took a protracted legal 
battle against a giant corporation to finally free them 
from harm's way.  
Diamond’s justice—achieved only after decades of 
struggle—is symptomatic of the larger struggles working 
class communities of color face when battling big industry 
and ineffectual regulators.  The crusades waged in 
Oklahoma, Florida and Louisiana show that residents 
must dig for truths with their own hands, wiping away 
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black particulate matter in Oklahoma, digging into the 
tainted groundwater in Florida, or capturing air in five-
gallon buckets in Louisiana.  Only with this evidence, 
literally gathered in their own hands, right on the fence-
lines, can seemingly powerless communities achieve 
power and attain the justice they seek.  Industry and local 
government, these case studies demonstrate, will not 
hand it to them. 
